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City of Portland v. EPA, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25780 (2007)
The City of Portland filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit
and the City of New York filed a motion to intervene regarding a 2006
rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The
rule required stringent measures to be taken to protect drinking water from
contamination by the Cryptosporidium parasite. Cryptosporidium is a
parasite that originates in human and animal feces, which can cause mild
flu-like symptoms when ingested and can be deadly in children, the
elderly, and others with weak immune systems. In Milwaukee in 1993, a
Cryptosporidium outbreak caused thousands of people to become sick and
killed approximately fifty people.
While the majority of cities protect against Cryptosporidium by
filtering and covering water supplies and sources, New York and Portland
simply took measures to protect their water sources from contact with
domestic animals and humans. However, wild animals could still
contaminate the water. The water reservoirs were located in urban areas
and uncovered. The cities claimed they protected the water by preventing
runoff and fencing the reservoirs. But, the EPA stated that the reservoirs
were still at risk for Cryptosporidium contamination from bird droppings,
small animals getting through the fences, and intentional human
contamination. Additionally, neither city filtered their water. The EPA
rule required changes in these water treatment systems.
In their petitions, the cities argued that the EPA had not performed
a required cost-benefit analysis, had not provided an opportunity for notice
and comment, and had not used the best available science. Secondly, the
cities claimed that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because it did not
respond to public comments, it lacked support, and it had incorrectly
estimated cryptosporidium's infectivity. The court found these arguments
meritless and irrelevant.
The Safe Drinking Water Act required the EPA to issue rules to
protect against Cryptosporidium contamination in drinking water. The
EPA's 1998 rule required a zero contaminate level goal for
Cryptosporidium, imposed treatment techniques, required covers on all
water reservoirs built after the rule, and required any system that filtered
their water to filter out Cryptosporidium. A 2003 proposed rule allowed
cities such as Portland and New York to develop a risk mitigation plan in
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lieu of covering or treating their drinking water. However, the final rule
promulgated in 2006 required covering and treatment of water, without the
option for risk mitigation plans.
In its opinion, the court found that the cost-benefit analysis was not
necessary since the rule required the most stringent feasible treatment
technique and the treatment techniques at issue were not infeasible. Next,
the court held that the rule was not arbitrary and capricious, since because
the EPA had cited on multiple relevant studies to support the rule and had
provided replies to cities' potential objections. Additionally, the court
noted that any comment brought by either city would not have affected the
final rule. Lastly, in response to the argument that the EPA had relied on
bad science, the court held that any reliance on inadequate science by the
EPA was a harmless.
The court found that since the Act required the most stringent
feasible treatment technique all of the mistakes alleged by the two cities
were harmless. In addition, the court held that the EPA had used adequate
science and evidence to support its rule, had given clear notice, and had
provided opportunity for comments and responses thereto. Therefore, the
court then denied the petition for review.
TANA SANCHEZ
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Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165 (2nd Cir. 2007)
The State of New York (State) filed a suit against Panex Industries,
Inc. (Panex) to recover unreimbursed environmental response costs in the
amount of $4.5 million incurred in the cleanup of a landfill used by one of
Panex's operating divisions. Panex had dissolved in 1985 under Delaware
General Corporation Law, which provides for a three-year limitation
period for dissolved corporations to wind up affairs and for unknown
claimants to assert claims against the corporation. Shortly after the threeyear limitation period under Delaware law had expired, the State filed
federal claims under CERCLA, which provides a six-year limitation
period for recovering environmental response costs, against Panex, and the
Panex trust. After the Panex trust had been depleted, the State was
granted leave to join Panex's shareholder-distributees.
The district court dismissed the State's claims against the
shareholder-distributees, and summary judgment was later granted to the
State with regard to the suits against Panex and the Panex trust, with the
district court holding that CERCLA preempted Delaware's three-year
limitation period that barred suits against Panex. Because neither Panex
nor the Panex trust had any assets to pay the judgment, the State appealed
the district court's order dismissing its claims against the shareholderdistributees. The shareholder-distributees cross-appealed the judgments
against both Panex and the Panex trust.
The State first argued that Delaware General Corporation Law §
278 did not bar its claim against the shareholder-distributees because the
common law trust fund doctrine, which gives creditors an equitable right
to follow corporate assets after dissolution, survives the enactment of §
278. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed this
argument, holding that § 278 did indeed formalize the continued existence
of the dissolved corporation's assets, and had supplanted the equitable
trust theory not only in Delaware, but in most jurisdictions. Since the
Court found the shareholder-distributees were not liable under § 278, the
Court also dismissed the State's next argument that the shareholderdistributees were liable under another section of Delaware law, because
the other section necessarily required that the shareholder-distributees be
liable under § 278.
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The State next argued that CERCLA did indeed preempt any time
limitation imposed by Delaware law on the State's claims, and that the
State should be able to sue the shareholder-distributees due to CERCLA's
preemption of Delaware law. The Court held that since there was no
actual conflict between state and federal law, the district court erred in
holding that CERCLA preempted the Delaware dissolution statute. The
Court noted that complying with both statutes was not a physical
impossibility since the State could have been in compliance with both
statutes by filing suit within three years of the dissolution. Furthermore,
the Court stated that Congress did not explicitly intend to preempt state
law and that Congress's scheme of federal regulation was not
comprehensive enough to justify a reasonable inference that there was no
room for the state to act. Additionally, the court noted that the conflict
between the two statutes was not a sharp one, that corporate law is
generally in the realm of the state, and that absent clear congressional
intent, federal preemption of state law is not favored.
The State's last argument was that the trust fund doctrine applies in
any timely-filed CERCLA action as a matter of federal common law. The
Court noted that courts are not to create specific rules only applying to
CERCLA that displace state corporate law just because a case involves
CERCLA. The Court also found that Congress intended the unaddressed
issues to be subject to state law. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
district court did not err in finding that Delaware law governed the
shareholder-distributee's susceptibility to CERCLA claims. The court
also reversed the district court's judgments against Panex and the Panex
trust.
CERCLA will not preempt state law unless there is a sharp conflict
between state law and CERCLA. Absent clear, congressional intent,
preemption of state law is disfavored, especially in the area of corporate
law, and other areas that are traditionally governed by the states. Since
there was not a sharp conflict between CERCLA and Delaware law, and
because Congress expressed no intent in CERCLA, either explicitly or
implicitly, to preempt state law, the Second Circuit found that the State
was barred by the Delaware dissolution statute from bringing its CERCLA
claim.
ANDREW REED

210

Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 494 F.Supp. 2D 1090
(W.D. Mo. 2007)
In 1998, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
determined a portion of the Missouri River, located near river mile 142,
alongside Jefferson City, needed to implement a flood damage reduction
measure in order to protect against future flood damages. The area is
currently protected by the Capitol View Levee; however, the levee has
been breached and suffered severe damages since the flood of 1993
resulting in losses of up to $18 million for the City of Jefferson City. The
Corps' solution to protect against future flood damage consisted of
building a levee 4.7 miles long and 23 feet high.
The Corps requested formal comments from several State and
Federal agencies on the "significant resources that might be impacted by
implementation of the preferred plan." The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS), the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources (MDNR) responded to the request, sharing many of the
same concerns with cumulative effects on the Missouri River as a whole
and increased development in the floodplains.
The NRCS found that the proposed levee would increase upstream
flooding and encourage development in the floodplain. The USFWS
looked to the cumulative effects of the levee on the Missouri River as a
whole and determined that "more and larger levees are increasing the
frequency and size of flood events." Similarly, the EPA found concern
with the cumulative impacts of levee construction on lower Missouri River
and stressed that the Corps needed to consider the effects on the physical,
chemical, and biological integrity of the Missouri River. The EPA
projected that construction of the levee would encourage development in
the floodplain and the Corps "has not gone far enough in analyzing
secondary effects." The MDNR found the levee would cause additional
flooding downstream, stream widening and shallowing, and increased
development in the floodplain.
In April 2001, the Corps issued its final report along with an
Environmental Assessment (EA) and a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI). The EA stated the Corps found no short-term or long-term
environmental effects and land available for development was limited to
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the project area and restricted by nearby airport regulations. Further, the
FONSI stated the levee would not have an effect on the quality of the
environment and an Environmental Impact Statement was therefore not
required.
Plaintiff Sierra Club brought this action in 2003 alleging the
Corps' EA is defective because the Corps failed to consider the
cumulative impact of its actions on flood heights and failed to evaluate the
secondary effects of development in floodplain areas. Sierra Club alleges
that if the Corps had conducted a cumulative review of the levee's effects,
they would have been required to complete an Environmental Impact
Statement in lieu of an EA and failure to do so was a violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The four State and Federal agencies asked to review the plan noted
concern with the cumulative impact of the proposed levee. Further, the
Corps' own regulations require an evaluation of cumulative impacts
before a permit may be issued. Accordingly, the Court found that the EA
completed by the Corps failed to consider the cumulative impact of the
proposed levee combined with other flood control structures that border
the Missouri River. Additionally, the Court held the Corps' finding that
the proposed levee would not affect future flood risks was arbitrary and
capricious and in violation of the APA. However, the Court did find that
the Corps adequately evaluated the secondary impacts on floodplain
development near the proposed levee and their decision was neither
arbitrary nor capricious.
CLAIRE MCCLINTIC

212

Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 499 F.3d 543 (7th
Cir. 2007)
Environmental groups sought for a review to reverse a permit
issued by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to Prairie State
Generating Company for building a 1,500-megawatt coal-fired electrical
generating plant. The proposed plant was a "mine-mouth" plant sitting at
the location of a coal seam containing enough high-sulfur coal to supply
the plant's fuel needs for thirty years. The coal could be transported from
the mine to the plant by an half of a mile long conveyor belt.
Environmental groups claimed that the permit was issued in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) for failure to require the "best available control
technology" ("BACT") to minimize sulfur dioxide emitted by Prairie
State's power plant. They also claimed that the ozone level that would be
produced in the area would exceed the limits imposed by the Clean Air
Act's national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS"), 42 U.S.C. §
7475(a)(3).
To satisfy BACT requirement, environmental groups argued that
Prairie State must bring low-sulfur coal from mines afar, which would
result in changes in the design of the plant, especially the design of the
facilities for receiving coal. The EPA maintained that redesigning of the
proposed plant by the permit applicant was not required under the BACT
unless ineffectual control measures were adopted intentionally. To clarify
this issue, the EPA distinguished between "control technology" as a means
of minimizing emissions from a pollution source and "redesign of
proposed facility" as changing the fundamental scope of the proposed
facility. This distinction created a line-drawing problem, i.e., "where
control technology ends and a redesign of the 'proposed facility' begins."
Because the line was not obvious and required expert judgment, the court
deferred to the EPA's decision as long as it would be within reason.
To determine whether, in this case, changing high-sulfur coal to
low-sulfur coal constituted control technology, the court gave two extreme
examples. If Prairie State's plant was not a mine mouth plant, the change
would have been the adoption of "control technology" had the change of
fuel source from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal only involved with a
change in the design of proposed plant no more than what would have
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been necessary to change in the design whenever there had been a change
in the fuel source. However, when the change of fuel source from coal to
nuclear fuel, it involved the redesign of the proposed plant because the
proposed plant must be redesigned from a coal-burning plant to a nuclear
plant. The court denied the review requested by environmental groups
because it considered this case a border-line case requiring expert
judgment. With respect to BACT, the court in its opinion pointed out that
the environmental groups could have relied on another provision which
directed the EPA to consider alternative control technologies suggested by
interested persons. In addition, the court made a point that the long brief
filed by environmental groups failed to provide expert opinion to support a
decision requiring expert judgment.
With respect to the ozone level, in 2003, the EPA replaced the old
one-hour standard with what it claimed to be more protective and more
stringent eight-hour standard. However, the EPA used the one-hour
formula to generate an eight-hour estimate to conclude that Prairie State's
plant would not increase the ozone level in the area because it had not
adopted a formula for the eight-hour standard. The environmental groups
argued that the EPA violated the § 7475(a)(3) because the one-hour
standard had been superseded by the eight-hour standard. The court made
an arithmetic analysis and concluded that if an emission level satisfied the
one-hour standard, it was likely to satisfy the eight-hour standard. The
court held that the EPA was permitted to use the formula adopted for the
older standard to make an estimate demonstrating that the plant would be
unlikely to violate the new standard. The court denied the review request
and again pointed out that the environmental groups made criticism
without suggestion of an alternative.
HANNAH

214

M. TIEN

Pollack v. United States DOD, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24352 (7th Cir.
2007)
In Pollackv. UnitedStates DOD, a concerned citizen and attorney,
Steven Pollack, sued the Department of Defense, the Army, and the Navy
for improperly transferring ownership of property, therefore violating the
Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA). This Act enables the President to clean up sites that are
contaminated with hazardous waste by delegating his powers to others.
The issue stems from a conflict between the Army and the EPA
over the construction of a landfill cap to prevent seeping waste. In 1993,
part of the base at Fort Sheridan was transferred from the Army to the
Navy for twenty four million dollars. The Army had vowed to "retain
responsibility and liability for environmental restoration" of the property
as a part of an agreement. Eventually, the waste from the landfill spilled
out into the air and water, leading the Army to develop an interim plan
until they could decide on an effective remedy. The Army launched this
interim plan shortly thereafter, comprised of installing new drainage and
collection systems, a "burn facility for gases," and a new topsoil cap and
liner for the landfill.
The EPA claims that the Army failed to meet the specifications
required to construct a landfill cap by using big rocks instead of small
ones, therefore allowing rainwater to enter the cap liner and affect its
ability to hold waste. Consequently, the EPA refused to sign off on the
project, causing the Army to cut off its funding for EPA cooperation.
Years later, the Navy decided to least part of its property abutting the
landfill to a private developer, which would build housing for Navy
families. Eventually, the Army initiated a final remedial plan in 2006 for
the landfill that is currently under review by the Illinois EPA for a final
determination.
Plaintiff Steven Pollack sued, objecting to both the transfer from
the Army to the Navy in 1993, and from the Navy to the private developer
in 2006. Pollack claims that because the United States EPA did not sign
off on the Army's final remedial plan before the transfers, it violated
CERCLA. After the district court dismissed the suit, plaintiff appealed to
this court.
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The court addresses the merits of Pollack's claim and concluded
that because the transfer from the Army to the Navy in 1993 happened
before the landfill issue was discovered, it would have been impossible for
the EPA to approve a cleanup plan that was yet to be in existence. The
second transfer did not include transferring the landfill, therefore is not
subject the CERCLA violation. In addition, the defendants argue that
although the transferred land abutted the landfill, the landfill was not on
the National Priorities List (NPL) of most dangerous hazardous waste
sites, thus they were free to work only with the Illinois EPA and didn't
need approval from the federal equivalent.
Furthermore, the court states that under CERCLA, no Federal
Court shall have jurisdiction to review challenges to CERCLA cleanup
efforts, however, may review challenges brought by citizen suits only if
the citizens bring suit after the cleanup is done before suing.
Pollack attempts to validate his argument by arguing that his claim
is not subject to this CERCLA section by pointing to technicalities, which
the court readily rejects by pointing to prevalent case law. Finally, Pollack
asserts that barring this type of suit unfairly prevents citizens from
challenging transfers of federally owned property, as CERCLA's broad
citizen suit provision would otherwise allow them. However, granting
Pollack's petition would create a loophole allowing citizens to indirectly
attack federal cleanups by going after any transfer of property preceding it.
As a result, the Supreme Court affirms the district courts decision to
dismiss Pollack's claim for lack of jurisdiction.
CELINA M. LOPEZ
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Missouri v. Westinghouse Elec., L.L.C., 487 F.Supp.2d 1076 (E.D. Mo.,
2007).
In 2000 Westinghouse Electric Company purchased the Hematite
Nuclear Facility and immediately began decommissioning the facility.
During the forty years previous the Hematite site was operated as a
nuclear fuel processing plant and was contaminated with radiological and
chemical wastes. During decontamination Westinghouse worked with the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (MDNR).
In 2005 the State of Missouri filed suit against Westinghouse
making several demands. First, Missouri requested injunctive relief
requiring Westinghouse to perform a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility
Study (RI/FS) to determine the nature and extent of the site contamination
and create a plan for decontamination. Second, Missouri requested that
Westinghouse implement the plan decided under the RI/FS and reimburse
MDNR for all past or future response costs at the Hematite site. As a
result of litigation Missouri and Westinghouse entered into a Consent
Decree. The decree was drafted according to Section 107 of CERCLA and
included a plan for decontamination of the Hematite site. The decree was
submitted for court approval.
Westinghouse then brought a second action against the United
States and several corporate defendants with possible liability for expenses
related to cleaning up the Hematite site. Note that the NRC, the federal
agency responsible for regulating the civilian use of nuclear materials,
took exception to Missouri's attempt to regulate radiological waste. The
defendants in this action intervened in the suit resulting from Missouri's
action against Westinghouse.
The intervenors based their argument on the assumption that states
are without federal authority to regulate radiological materials and that any
state authority that might exist is pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA). Westinghouse and the State countered providing three arguments.
First, the proponents of the Consent Decree cite authority under CERCLA
granting State's the power to enter into a Consent Decree. Proponents
argued that Supremacy Clause analysis does not apply because Missouri
brought the claim under CERCLA. The Court rejected this argument
finding that Missouri required a federal basis for the regulatory action.
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Since no cooperative agreement was entered between Missouri and the
federal government, Missouri's authority to enter the regulatory action
must come from State authority. Therefore, Missouri's action was subject
to pre-emption from federal regulatory agencies and laws.
Second, the proponents argued that the AEA does not pre-empt
State action when the facility has been decommissioned. In response to
this argument the Court looked to precedent and the NRC's interpretation
of the AEA and found no basis for this argument. The Court determined
that the AEA pre-empts state regulation of nuclear safety issues at
operation or non-operation facilities. The Court pointed out that Missouri
retained authority over the non-radiological contaminants at the Hematite
site. If the Consent Decree was constructed narrowly to apply strictly to
the non-radiological components, the Decree would have been valid if it
did not run afoul of federal law. Since no distinction was made Missouri
was regulating an area controlled by federal in violation of the Supremacy
Clause.
Finally, the last argument presented was that the Consent Decree
contained limiting language therefore pre-emption was avoided. The Court
found that the limiting language did not affect the pre-emption of the
Consent Decree because, even though the language avoided a conflict with
federal law, it did not change the fact that Missouri was asserting the right
to act in an area regulated by the AEA.
In sum, the Court denied the State of Missouri's motion to enter
the Consent Decree because it ran afoul of the Supremacy Clause by
attempting to assert authority in an area of regulation delegated to federal
agencies.

LEE STOCKHORST
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Our Children's Earth Foundation v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 2007 WL 3132412 (9th Circuit)
In 1972 Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA) in order to
pursue the goal of cleaning up the nation's waterways. The CWA was
intended to have an impact on the biological welfare of water-based
ecosystems and also to effect pollution levels in America's waterways. To
effect pollution levels, the CWA included a permitting system for
pollutants which carefully monitored the amount of pollutants allowed to
be released. These permits would control pollution through technology
based effluent limitations on pollutant discharge.
The current case was brought against the EPA with charges that it failed
its mandatory duties when it did abandoned a technology based review of
pollutant discharge levels in favor of hazard based review, it neglected to
identify new pollution sources, and did not timely publish plans for future
reviews. A technology based review focuses on current technology, and
achieving the maximum decrease in pollution at the current level of
technology, where the hazard based review focuses on identification of
pollutants and reduce those hazards. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the EPA saying all the claims covered only
discretionary acts, and thus plaintiffs could not force the EPA to do any of
them.
Upon appeal the circuit court looks to the statutory framework of
the CWA to determine the issue of technology review. The court rejects
the EPA's argument that technology based review can be completely
abandoned at their discretion. Looking at the statutory framework, as well
as the legislative intent behind the act, the court finds that technology
based review is mandatory for the agency and not discretionary. The court
notes that this does not mean that the review must change the guidelines,
only that the review of the system must be done at least in part with a
technology based review. As it is not clear on the record whether the EPA
did take in to account a technology based review, that portion of the case
is remanded for further proceedings.
Turning to the next two issues, the court simply finds the
publication duty to be mandatory, but not in the manner that OCE wishes.
OCE claims that the duty coincides with a calendar year, while the EPA
claims it can meet the mandatory duties prescribed by statute without
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publication on that time schedule. The court agrees with the EPA (giving
great deference to their interpretation of the statutes) and says that the
CWA requires biennial publication, but not on any given time schedule.
The court also says that identification of new pollution sources is a
mandatory act, but that the number of new sources to identify, as well as
whether to issue guidelines for those new sources is discretionary. The
court again turns to statutory language in showing that the mandatory duty
is limited to only some identification, and without clear language to the
contrary deference is again given to the agency interpretation for actions
beyond the clear language of the statute.
BENJAMIN HODGES
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Reichold, Inc. v. United States Metals Refining Co., 2007 WL
3380062 (D.N.J.)
Plaintiff Reichhold, Inc. ("Reichhold") brought an action against
Defendant United States Metal Refining Co. ("USMR") seeking legal and
declaratory relief under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") as amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") and the New
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act ("the Spill Act"). The District
Court dismissed for lack of ripeness a portion of Reichhold's claim for
declaratory relief based on Reichhold's claim of contribution liability.
Reichhold then moved the Court to reconsider or clarify the Order
following the dismissal ("the August Order"). The District Court
subsequently decided that the August Order was unclear and vacated the
August Order. The Court issued a superceding Order dismissing for lack
of ripeness only Reichhold's claim for declaratory relief pursuant to its
contribution liability claim under §113(f). The Court held that Reichhold
was entitled to seek a declaratory judgment to establish liability under

§107(a).
Reichhold purchased land located in Carteret, New Jersey from
USMR in 1960 and 1962. USMR owned the land and operated a large
secondary copper smelter and refinery for approximately 80 years. While
USMR owned the property, USMR may have contaminated portions of
the land with slag and other metal contaminates. It was believed this led
to widespread lead and other metal contamination of the site. It is also
believed that Reichhold contributed to the site contamination by filling
and grading the majority of the property. During the mid-1980s Reichhold
began discussions with the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection about the possible site contamination.
Reichhold then
confronted USMR regarding a possible claim of liability against USMR.
Reichhold asserts that Defendants are responsible for widespread
site contamination of lead and other metals. Reichhold also contends that
the contamination caused by the Defendants will lead to future costs
associated with the site cleanup. USMR moved to dismiss Reichhold's
declaratory judgment claim. Reichhold asserted that the subsequent
dismissal illustrated by the August Order focused on Reichhold's ability to
obtain a declaration of USMR's liability for contribution.
221

The Court stated that §107(a) and §113(f) both allow for plaintiffs
to seek declaratory judgments, however the ripeness threshold is different
for each provision.
Section §113(f) does not specifically contain
declaratory relief language.
Therefore, plaintiffs must meet the
requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires an
existence of an actual case or controversy. The Court held that Reichhold
could not establish an actual case or controversy. CERCLA, however,
does provide expressly for declaratory relief as long as the plaintiff
establishes principle liability under §107(a). CERCLA allows parties that
have incurred costs for cleaning up a contaminated site to recover its costs
from parties responsible for the contamination.
The District Court held that a plaintiff need only prove liability for
costs already incurred in order to be entitled to a declaratory judgment
under §107(a). The Court also stated that the entry of a declaratory
judgment was mandatory even if the possible future costs are somewhat
speculative. The Court granted Reichold's motion to clarify.
The Court ultimately held that Reichhold was entitled to seek a
declaratory judgment because Reichhold was seeking to establish liability
pursuant to §107(a) for environmental cleanup costs already incurred.
MICHAEL PAGE
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Friends of Pinto Creek, et al. v. EPA, et al., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23251
In Friends of Pinto Creek v. EPA, the claim involved the approval
of a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to Carlota Copper
Company ("Carlota") which would allow the company to discharge
copper from their mining operations into Arizona's Pinto Creek, a
waterway that is above the water quality standards for copper. Carlota
planned to build a copper mine and processing facility near the Pinto
Creek. The company also planned to construct diversion channels through
which they would reroute the creek around the mine and block the
groundwater from flowing into the mine.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that the
U.S. Forest Service determine whether a pending project would have a
significant impact on the environment and to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement to their findings. The Army Corps of Engineers must
also issue an Environmental Assessment which analyzes the construction
of the diversion channels. The EPA issued the permit to Carlota and, after
a petition for review was filed by Friends of Pinto Creek, Grand Canyon
Chapter of the Sierra Club, and Maricopa Audubon Society and Citizens
for the Preservation of Powers Gulch and Pinto Creek ("Organizations"),
the Environmental Appeals Board (Appeals Board) denied review. The
petition for review was based on two arguments: 1) the permit to discharge
a pollutant into Pinto Creek is in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA)
and applicable regulations; and 2) the EPA failed to include and regulate
all discharges which is a violation of the CWA and applicable regulations.
The Organizations argued that because Carlota was a "new
discharger" of copper into Pinto Creek, which is waterway that is already
"impaired" due to copper pollutants and already exceeds its water quality
standards, the permit should not have been issued. The CWA requires that,
in order to obtain a permit, a new discharger must show that there is room
for more of the pollutant in the already contaminated waterway and that
the existing dischargers are subject to compliance schedules to conform to
water quality standards. Here, the court found that Carlota had no plans
nor did the company have a compliance schedule. The company also
failed to show that if Carlota were allowed to discharge pollutants into
Pinto Creek that the water quality standard would be met. Therefore, the
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court held that the EPA cannot issue a permit until those conditions are
met.
Last, the Organizations claimed that the EPA did not consider the
additional copper pollutants from the two diversion channels Carlota
planned to build in order to divert the surface and ground water around the
mine. They also argued that the Appeals Board refusal to consider those
two sources because the issue was not raised in the first comment period
was made in error. During the first of two comment periods for Carlota's
permit, the Societies raised the issue that these sources would in fact
contribute pollutants to both the Pinto Creek and the Powers Gulch stream.
The court agreed and found that the claims concerning the diversion
channels had been timely raised and should have been considered by the
Appeals Board. Therefore, the court held that the NPDES Permit was
issued to Carlota Copper Mine based on "errors of law under the Clean
Water Act ... and the NEPA" and vacated and remanded the permit to the

EPA for further proceedings.
BREANNE ARDILLA
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Consolidated Companies Inc v. Union Pacific Railroad Co, 499 F.3d 382
( 5 th Cir. 2007).

Union Pacific Railroad Co (Union Pacific) sought an interlocutory
appeal from two legal findings by a Louisiana Federal District Court, in a
suit that had been brought by Consolidated Companies (Conco). Conco
purchased one tract of land (Conco tract), out of three contiguous parcels,
from the Southern Pacific Company, now Union Pacific, in 1964. Prior to
the purchase, the three contiguous parcels were used by the now Union
Pacific as their railroad yard. In its capacity as a railroad yard, Union
Pacific, used above ground tankers to store fuel, oil, and dynamite, and
through its operations at the site contaminated the groundwater and soil.
Conco, who now operates a food warehouse and distribution
facility on the Conco tract discovered the contaminations in 1996, and
brought suit against Union Pacific under federal and state statutes. Conco
sought monetary damages and an injunction directing Union Pacific to
clean up the contamination on the entire former railroad site under the
Federal statute, Resource Conservation Recovery Act, (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 and the state statute, Louisiana Environmental Quality Act,
(LEQA) LouisianaRevised Statutes 30:2001.
Union Pacific conceded that the Conco tract was contaminated and
Conco could bring suit to recover on that parcel. However, the dispute in
the District Court was a limited trial to determine if the contiguous parcels
of land that formerly made up the entire site could be considered a single
facility under the definition of either statute. Essentially, Conco was
trying to bring suit on behalf of all three parcels of land, even though they
only owned one. The District Court held that it could under both RCRA
and LEQA.
Union Pacific appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit and raised two arguments as to why the District Court
was in error: 1) Conco does not have standing to bring its claims under the
RCRA and the LEQA because of lack of "injury in fact" as required by
Article III of § 2 of the United States Constitution and 2) the District Court
erred in holding that the entire former railroad yard can constitute a single
"facility" for purposes of RCRA and LEQA. The court of appeals took
each argument in turn and determined the District Court was correct and
affirmed its judgment.
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The Fifth Circuit rejected Union Pacific's first argument that
Conco had not suffered any injury in fact. From Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992) the court stated that to have standing a
plaintiff must show they have been injured in fact, the injury is traceable
to the action of the defendant, and that the court has the power to redress
the injury by a favorable decision. Union Pacific did not object to the fact
that Conco meets these requirements with respect to the tract of land it
owns, but not to the other two tracts of land because there would be no
injury to Conco on property it does not own. The Court disagreed, relying
on Lujan again, that the threat of harm may constitute an injury in fact,
and the potential for the contamination in the contiguous parcels of land to
migrate to Conco's property is enough of a threat of injury sufficient for
standing.
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that the entire railroad
site could not be considered a single facility for purposes of RCRA or
LEQA. RCRA does not define facility expressly in the definition section
of the statute, but does in a section addressing underground storage tanks.
This definition of facility read "For purposes of this paragraph the term
"facility" means, with respect to any owner or operator, all underground
storage tanks used for the storage of petroleum which are owned or
operated by such owner or operator and located on a single parcel of
property (or on any contiguous or adjacent property)." 42 U.S.C. §
6991b(h)(6)(D). The court, applying the rule that identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,
determined the definition of facility was expansive enough to allow Conco
to bring suit regarding the entire former railroad site. The court also found
support for this conclusion in the purpose of RCRA, which is to "...speed

compliance with environmental laws." If Union Pacific's argument was
accepted the result would be opposite to this purpose. If a narrower
definition of "facility" was applied a plaintiff would have to bring an
individual lawsuit for each parcel of land thus slowing compliance with
environmental laws.
The Court came to the same expansive definition of "facility"
under the state statute as well. Under LEQA "facility" is defined as "a
pollution source or any public or private property or facility where an
activity is conducted which is required to be regulated under this subtitle
and which does or has the potential to..." contaminate the environment
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with hazardous substances. La. R.S. 30:2004(14). A "pollution source" is
defined as "the immediate site or location of a discharge or potential
discharge, including such property surrounding property necessary to
secure or quarantine the area from the general public."
La. R.S.
30:2004(13). Due to the fact the entire former site is contaminated and
that hazardous waste on each individual tract may potentially migrate
beyond its own borders, the entire three parcels qualify as a "facility."
After soundly disposing of both of Union Pacific's arguments in
the negative, the court held that the district did not err in its decision that
the entire contiguous parcels or property that made up the former railroad
site can constitute a single "facility" for purposes of Conco's claims under
RCRA and LEQA, and therefore because of the sufficient injury either
present or threatened to Conco, they properly had standing to bring their
suit with respect to the contiguous parcels of property which they did not
own.
RYAN STARNES
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